the Naples typhus epidemic, and as an anti-malaria measure. All this has become ancient history, but you may be interested to hear something of the experiences and difficulties during the days when we were experimenting with an insecticide which was rather an unknown quantity.
The Naples typhus epidemic.-Naples when we occupied it in October 1943 was a very sad city, badly bombed, overcrowded, with a depressed and undernourished populace living in considerable numbers permanently in shelters. Below the streets of Naples and on the outskirts of the city are innumerable caves and tunnels, many dating back to ancient times. These were the permanent homes of thousands of people. Naples seemed to be the perfect stage setting for a large-scale epidemic of a disease such as typhoid or typhus. Means of heating and lighting were lacking, the water mains and sewers were ruptured, and a large proportion of the people were lousy. For example, the largest civil hospital housed almost a thousand patients, all said to be infested. The public services, including the public health and practitioner services were quite disorganized, despair and apathy ruled the land. Under these circum3tances it was hopeless to expect any but the scantiest of infectious disease statistics. The Allied Military Government (A.M.G.) commenced to function at an early date, and their medical officers worked magnificently in trying to restore the medical services to normal. My main fear was of an outbreak of typhoid, but fortunately this did not occur in Naples, although other towns were severely affected. We were on the lookout for the occurrence of typhus cases, and on November 20 information was received that 7 cases had been reported in the city. A conference was called the next day and a committee appointed to investigate-it consisted of Allied and Italian medical officers. Clinical examination of the cases suggested that we were, indeed, dealing with classical typhus. Although at that time no information as to previous cases could be obtained from the Italian doctors, documents were brought to light at a later date that made it clear that sporadic cases had been occurring since March. It was said to have been introduced by Serbian Prisoners of War who were scattered throughout the city as a result of Allied bomb damage. Civilian cases occurred in July-a man visiting a bathing place used by troops, who returned home lousy, was the first case. Afterwards cases occurred in jails, but many prisoners-contacts-were said to have escaped and were not traced. The Allied Committee arranged for the setting up of disinfestation and bathing centres, but all the principal disinfestors had been destroyed by bombing or enemy sabotage. Fuel and soap were almost unobtainable. Indeed, soap was extremely scarce throughout the epidem;c, and the populace remained unwashed, in particular the 20,000 shelter inhabitants. Application was immediately made to higher Allied Auithority for supplies of soap and insecticide powders.
Progress of the epidemic. Typhuis Commission commenced work early in January; a mass delousing scheme was rapidlv organized and energeticallv pursued. Twelve public centres were soon functioning, inoculation was commenced, and propagancda increased. This work was handed over to the Allied Commission on February 19. Drs. Soper and Davis, who did admirable work, used American Service 'M.Y.L." insecticide by means of hand dust guns of the "Hudson Admiral" type. During this period only about 10% of the dustings were done with D.D.T. (10% in talc). 5,000 cltstings (approx.) were carried out during this tinme, about 3,000 of them were on typhus contacts. The principle of mechanical dusting was quickly taken Up by us, using AL 63 powder. Power units were also obtained from local garages and experimented with. The British Hygiene Services were responsible for the 30,000 civilians in their employ, and for the Italian Armv (who }ad a high infestation incidence and a correspondingly high typhus morbiditv rate at the early stages of the outbreak) as well as refugees and British Troops. Yugoslav prisoners were hospitalized under our direction in Italy.
Mlanv of these arrived with typhus. All were dusted with AL 63 on arrival, many having been previously dealt with in Yugoslavia before departure. This focus of infection produced no secondarv cases in Italy.
The dust gun was such an admirable weapon that we commenced local manufacture, at first by Italian tinsmiths, and later in army workshops. Field hygiene sections also experimented with and turned out quantities of hand and power sprayers. All British troops were dusted with AL 63 weekly. A high standard of cleanliness was insisted on, and the usual regulations about visiting civilian establishments and contact with civilians generallv were put into operation. Civilian public places were closed. A local typhus committee and an Allied Typhus Control Board were formed and supervised and directed preventive measures. Unfortunately, the shelter population could not be cleared owing to frequent enemy air raids, and the fact that there was no alternative nousing accommodation during the day. This was, however, not entirely disadvantageous, for this section of the population was always available for treatment bv the duLsting teams who visited caves and shelters periodically.
After many difficulties the infectious disease hospital badly bom1bed-as put into operation for housing the patients. A section of this was staffed by Lieut.-Colonel Stuart Harris, R.A.M.C., and his team assisted by 12 British Armv Nurses, and members of the Friends Ambulance Unit. The work of these people, under conditionis of extreme difficulty and a high degree of personal danger was excellent. The U.S. Typhus Commission was assisted in the case searching, contact delousing and inoculation schemes by a number of R.A.M.C. Officers. British and U.S. Ambulances wvere used to augment the limited and indifferent Italian transport, but transport arrangements for the Typhus Commission personnel were inadequate throughout. From January 1 all mass and contact civ ilian dusting was clone with D.D.T. under the organization of General Fox, U.S.A.M.C. (Up to a maximum of 70,000 daily, exclusive of the dusting with AL 63 of civilian emplovees and refugees.) The populace needed no compulsion to avail themselves of the service; they soon learned that almost immediate freedom from irritation resulted, and they gladly welcomed the change.
Sutbsequenit progress of the epidemic. Up to about January 9 cases rose rapidly to 65 (lailv. but afterwards there was a dramatic fall from 340 per week to half this number.
At this time, Naples was placed out of bounds to all the Allied Forces except those on necessary duty. The curve remained steady for the ensuing three weeks, after which it again fell sharply to 40 earlv in February, and thereafter the epidemic gradually declined. 1,600 cases occurred in all. Cases outside the city increased at this time and continued for manv weeks, owing to the imperfect control of civilian movement in-iand out of the citv. There can be no doubt, taking into account the vrxelve-dav incubation period, and the fact that few cases were notified before the fourth or fifth dav. that the initial control of the epidemic was brought about as a result of intensive case searching and the ringing of contacts with barriers of insecticide. At this time D.D.T. was used onlv to a very limited extent. The usual anti-tvphus measures employedn must also have played an imnortant part. The epidemic, checked bv this initial onlslauight, was given its final knock-out blow by the large-scale use of D.D.T.
During the whole epidemic only one British case occurred a deserter. wvho was heavily infested when apprehended No case was reported among the 20,000 to 30,000 civilian employees, and few in the Italian Army after December. AL 63 alonle was lsed for dlusting these groups.
The fight against the epidemlic has bcen callcd the second battle of Na\ples. and undoubtedlv, had it not been won, the Allied cause mav well have been serioulsly endangered. Tribute must be pai(d to all who took part in the 1battle the members of the U.S. Typhus Commission, the Rockefeller Foundation workers, A.M.G. and British and American Medical Services personnel, all of whom worked untiringly in fuill co-operation and harmony.
The lessons learned.-Naples taught us that an army can live ancl ork in an overcrowded, war-damaged, typhus-ridden citv, provided a(leqtuate precautions are taken. (Up to the middle of Januarv, a relativelv small proportion of British troops was protected bv inoculation.) It showed us the benefits of mechanical methods of using insecticides on fully clothed subjects, and enabled the cumbersome steam and hot air disinfestors which took up so muich transport, to be dispensed with. It also showed bevond question that D.D.T. was a new weapon of tremendous possibilities.
Technziqule of dutsting. This knowvledge was used 'with advantage in preventing an(l treating infestation among the troops during the later stages of the campaign in Italv and in N.W. Europe and in dealing with the thousands of Axis prisoners and Allied ex-prisoners who passed through our hands at the cessation of hostilities. There was, however, need for education, and adherents of the old regime were sometimes hard to convince that duisting alone (at three intervals of a week) was sufficient. This was largely clue to the fact that since the ova are not affected bv duisting, a few lice were often discovered on members of units who had been treated a week previously. D.D.T. does not kill quicklv, bLut its persistent action is a safeguard against the reinfestation which is always liable to occur after steam or hot air treatment of the clothing, although this method kills eggs and adults alike. Mechanical dusting enables large numbers of subjects to be treated quickly. The powder is applied to the head, forced ulp the arms, downl the front and back of the neck and the pubic and gluteal regions. Except in cases of very heavy infestation it should not be necessary to introduce powder hetveen different layers of clothing or to (Idust blankets and hedding.
MALIARIA\ CON 1ROT,
The possibilities of D.I).T. as an anti-malaria measure vere SOOll realized, andl earlv in 1943 experiments were commenced in its uise on the ground and in the air. An enornmous amount of work was done bv medical officers of the Allied Control Conmmission tunder the direction of Col. Paul Russell, the Rockefeller Team, and British and Anmerican malariologists. In addition, Major Cranford Benson, who was in charge of an Entomnological Research Unit and who had carried out valuable pioneer work on impregnate(d shirts, continued his researches on the use of D.D.T. in the field. The information thuts gained enabled a technique to be evolved which was puit into operation cdLuring the malaria season with considerable success. It is believed, also, that the pioneer swork was made use of in other theatres of war. The malaria danger in Italy was verv great. Deliberate enemy sabotage had resulted in vast areas, like the Pontine MIarshes, becoming once again dangerous breeding grounds, and the menace of a flooded Po Valley loomecl ahead. The war had also brought abouit a cessation of civilian anti-malaria schemes, an(d the Italian Army from Sardinia provided a new and dangerous reservoir of infection. Fortunately, our fears of a large-scale malaria epidemic were not realized: the British Army morbidity rate was, in fact, lower than during the previous year. That the risk was there was evidenced by the civilian incidence in the Littoria province where at least 30,000 cases occurred during the summer of 1944 out of a population of 240,000. The cases occurred in that part of the province flooded as a result of destruction of pumping stations and canals, where the mosquito population was enormous. In similar area-s. occupied by troops owing to operational necessity,, where D.D.T. spraving was used, comparatively few cases occurred. As the 8th Armv advanced, malaria control teams sprayed all houses, cowsheds, &c., with anti-mosquito spray utsing power sprayers. This gave a quick knock-out effect on mosquitoes. They were followed by teams who used 3 to 5% D.D.T. solution in kerosene; knapsack sprayers were used. There is hardly a house or animal-shed in Central and Northern Italv which does not give evidence of this on its walls, where the familiar white letters "D.D.T." followed by the date and number of the malaria control unit carrying out the work-record the work done. The first essential of D.D.T. spraying is to use a coarse spray, and the happy medlium between too fine a spray and a wasteful wet sprav nmust be aimed at. It is necessarv, therefore, that whatever spraying apparatus is used, the jet be of a suitable size approx. 1/32 in. The jet of the apparatus should be held from 1 I/2 to 2 feet from the wall surface. Although the lethal action of D.D.T. persists for about three months, spraving as an anti-fly or anti-mosquito measureshouldl be repeated monthlv: a qtuart of a 5% solutioin wsill treat 1,000 square feet. Toxic effects. No ill-effects were noticed during the treating of more than a million civilians in Naples with 10% D.D.T. in talc, neither were the operators who were always white with dust adversely affected. Masks, gloves and gas capes were used by the Army operators of D.D.T./Kerosene solutions, because exact information as to the toxicity of these solutions was not known. Two workers were affected, but the symptoms were suggestive of heat-stroke. It is considered that reasonable precautions should always be taken, not only because of a possible D.D.T. absorption, but also against a kerosene risk. Mlechanically unsound apparatus in which there is much leaking should not be used; it is wasteful and adds to the risks of the operator.
Paints anzd distempers.-The use of oil-bound water paints and distempers in which 5% D.D.T. is incorporated were experimented with. This method of treatment of cookhotuses, messrooms and latrines has great possibilities. CONCLUSIONS D.D.T. is undoubtedly the most remarkable insecticide yet produced and provides the worker in preventive medicine with a new weapon of tremendous power. It played a big part in protecting our Armies overseas. The knowledge thus gained should be made use of fully in civilian life. But the question must be asked: is it yet safe for general use? Details have already been made known of its lethal effect on benign insects such as bees and ladybirds and even minnows and trout, snakes and frogs are said to have been killed following spraying from the air. Preparations labelled "D.D.T." are now on sale to the public in many chemists' shops, grocers and ironmongers and general stores. The cartons I have seen give no information as to the strength of D.D.T. or the nature of the vehicle in which it is contained, neither are there any instructions as to how the preparation should be used. The public are liable to use it indiscriminately and wrongly, and it is felt that its sale should be controlled, and that full details of the composition of each product should be clearly marked on the container. The suggestion is made that these matters should be dealt with by legislation as quickly as possible. Recently in Germany as many as 300 to 400 a month have been seen. The dermatitis affected those areas where the shirt was pressed against the skin and in most cases there was an associated purpura on the areas involved. Numerous tests with D.D.T. both as a powder and in various bases were almost consistently negative and I am sure the irritant agent is not D.D.T. as such. We wondered whether some alteration might occur in D.D.T. during washing, &c., but all our investigations have failed to convict D.D.T. It is, however, a striking fact that this rash has been limited almost entirely to B.L.A., which was the one army using impregnated shirts.
The men went over to France in a remarkably clean state, the incidence for both lousiness and scabies being only 1 per 1,000 per month. This state of affairs continued as long as they remained in Normandy, but on moving into Belgium and Holland where they came into closer contact with the civilians, the incidence of scabies, and pediculosis pubis rose by eight or ten times-, whilst that of pediculosis corporis remained steady. This could onlv be attributed to the D.D.T., though why it did not affect pediculosis pubis is difficult to say. As I have shown elsewhere (see Brit. med. J., 1945 (ii) , 255) D.D.T. does not affect scabies.
Dr. C. J. Hackett asked Colonel Chalke what dose of mepacrine was being taken in Italy at the time and place in which he said D.D.T. had been so effective in combating malaria. He knew areas in Burma during the war where considerable D.D.T. usage was associated with low malarial incidence and vice versa. At the same time, however, good suppressive mepacrine discipline was practised in the areas of low malarial incidence-and vice versa.
Dr. C. C. Chesterman asked whether there was anv pathological evidence of degeneration of the basal ganglia in human beings poisoned by D.D.T. The symptoms suggested it and it would be interesting if a poison so toxic to insects were specific for the more primitive neurons of the brain.
Dr. Chalke (in replv) said that a daily mepacrine tablet was ordered for all fighting tro-ns and certnin base troons, but discipline was variable and generally onlv fa;rlv good. He Lelt that D.D.T. control had proved effective. Units staging or camping in uncontrolled malarious areas always suffered severely from malaria.
